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Abstract—Automatic prohibited object detection within 2D/3D
X-ray Computed Tomography (CT) has been studied in literature
to enhance the aviation security screening at checkpoints. Deep
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) have demonstrated supe-
rior performance in 2D X-ray imagery. However, there exists
very limited proof of how deep neural networks perform in
materials detection within volumetric 3D CT baggage screening
imagery. We attempt to close this gap by applying Deep Neural
Networks in 3D contraband substance detection based on their
material signatures. Specifically, we formulate it as a 3D semantic
segmentation problem to identify material types for all voxels
based on which contraband materials can be detected. To this
end, we firstly investigate 3D CNN based semantic segmentation
algorithms such as 3D U-Net and its variants. In contrast to the
original dense representation form of volumetric 3D CT data,
we propose to convert the CT volumes into sparse point clouds
which allows the use of point cloud processing approaches such
as PointNet++ towards more efficient processing. Experimental
results on a publicly available dataset (NEU ATR) demonstrate
the effectiveness of both 3D U-Net and PointNet++ in materials
detection in 3D CT imagery for baggage security screening.
Index Terms—3D volumetric data, deep convolutional neural
network, X-ray computed tomography, baggage data, 3D object
detection, 3D segmentation, material based detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Effective and efficient baggage screening at checkpoints in
airports is crucial for aviation security. In most airports, X-ray
machines are deployed to scan hand baggage for prohibited
objects and contraband/threat materials. The reconstructed X-
ray imagery is shown to human operators who will use their
expertise and experience to find out potential prohibited items
within the images. The task is challenging when the baggage
is packed with clutter such as large electronics since the
resulting inter-occlusion between objects may lead to difficulty
in identifying potential threat and contraband items. For this
reason, passengers are usually required to divest any large elec-
tronic devices (e.g., laptop, tablet) and liquids before security
screening. To improve the detection rate without affecting the
checkpoint throughput, airports are currently increasing the
use of 3D CT screening which does not require the removal
of electronic devices and liquids during baggage screening.
The reconstructed 3D CT images provide more information
and make it possible for the human operators to inspect the
3D CT images from differing views.
In recent years, impressive progress in deep learning tech-
niques has enabled the possibility of fully automatic prohibited
object detection in 2D X-ray imagery with high precision
and very low false alarm rates [1], [2]. With the success
of automatic threat object detection in 2D X-ray imagery,
attempts have been made to extend this idea to 3D CT
imagery with promising results achieved in prior work [3],
[4]. However, the techniques used in [3] and [4] rely on
the detection of specific object appearance and shape (e.g.,
handguns, bottles, knives, etc.) hence is likely to fail in
detecting contraband materials (e.g., explosive material, drugs,
etc.) which can appear in arbitrary shapes. Existing research
in contraband/threat material classification and detection are
mainly based on traditional approaches such as morphological
operations based segmentation followed by a classifier [5]. It
is unknown how deep learning techniques perform in materials
detection within 3D CT imagery.
To address this issue, we attempt to address the contra-
band material detection problem within volumetric 3D CT
baggage security screening imagery. Specifically, we formulate
it as a semantic segmentation problem and generate voxel-
wise semantic labelling maps based on the materials. Post-
processing is subsequently applied to the segmentation results
to estimate the potential contraband material signatures. We
use semantic segmentation methods such as the popular U-Net
[6] architecture and its variants. Alternatively, we investigate
the possibility of converting the dense volumetric 3D data to
sparse point clouds and use point cloud processing methods
(e.g., PointNet++ [7]) for semantic segmentation.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach to
contraband material detection in 3D CT volumes, we conduct
experiments on the public Northeastern University Automatic
Threat Recognition (NEU ATR) dataset [8]. Experimental
results demonstrate our proposed approach using 3D Convo-
lutional Neural Networks (CNN) based U-Net architectures
outperforms traditional 3D segmentation based methods [5]
whilst point cloud based methods are more computationally
efficient.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• the first attempt to address contraband materials detection
within volumetric 3D CT baggage security screening
imagery using various deep learning models such as 3D
U-Net and PointNet++.
• the first attempt to convert volumetric 3D data to point
clouds to promote computationally efficient processing
and to compare 3D U-Net architectures and PointNet++
as two differing representation paradigms for volumetric
3D imagery processing.
• a framework for contraband materials detection is pro-
posed by formulating it as a semantic segmentation
problem followed by post-processing operations and is
validated through extensive experiments on a publicly
available dataset with three types of target materials for
detection and classification (i.e. saline, rubber and clay).
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review existing work related to our own
from the perspective of baggage security screening and 3D
semantic segmentation.
A. Baggage Security Screening
Automatic object detection and recognition algorithms have
been proposed and evaluated for baggage aviation security
screening based on 2D X-ray images [1], [9]. The use of
CNN architectures and object detection frameworks boosts the
performance with a high detection rate and a low false-positive
rate. For instance, Gaus et al. [10] evaluate the effectiveness
of Faster R-CNN [11], Mask R-CNN [12] and RetinaNet [13]
in detecting six different objects (i.e. bottle, hairdryer, iron,
toaster mobile and laptop) in 2D X-ray baggage images.
To enable automatic baggage screening using 3D CT im-
agery, a variety of studies have been carried out in recent years
[5], [14]–[21].
One research direction is object segmentation based on the
material and morphological structure [5], [14], [19]. Specif-
ically, Mouton et al. [19] propose a two-stage approach for
object segmentation within 3D CT imagery. A CT volume
is firstly coarsely segmented based on the voxel intensity
ranges of pre-defined materials. Subsequently, a variety of
shape descriptors are computed as features for the random
forest classifier to determine a segment resulted from the first
stage is good (containing only one object) or bad (containing
multiple objects and hence need further segmentation). Wang
et al. [5] along with others [8], [22] studied the issue of object
segmentation and classification in 3D CT imagery and focused
mainly on the material characteristics without considering
any specific prohibited item (e.g., firearm, knife, etc.). An
approach to 3D segmentation is proposed based on recursive
morphological operations and the Support Vector Machines
(SVM) were employed for the classification of three types of
materials [5].
3D object detection within 3D CT baggage security screen-
ing imagery has been studied in [3], [23], [24]. Flitton et al.
[24] evaluate the effectiveness of different 3D descriptors in a
search-based detection approach. Their approach is limited to
detect known objects for which the reference data are assumed
to be available. Such an assumption hinders its application in
practice when the reference data are usually unavailable. Wang
et al. [3] use contemporary object detection frameworks based
on 3D CNN and evaluate its performance on individual ob-
ject detection independently. However, most of these existing
works focus on the prohibited objects of specific appearances
and shapes and may not perform well for contraband items of
specific materials. To close this gap, we attempt to investigate
the possibility of using 3D deep learning techniques [25],
[26] for contraband materials detection within volumetric 3D
CT imagery for security screening. In parallel to the research
mentioned above, there also exist studies on Explosive Device
Systems (EDS) for aviation security screening [27]–[30] which
focus on the detection of explosive materials.
B. 3D Segmentation
3D segmentation is a typical approach to 3D scene under-
standing based on RGB-D data [31]–[34]. The first category
of approaches to RGB-D semantic segmentation encoded the
depth map as an image which can be processed by 2D
CNN in a similar way to RGB image processing [31], [33].
Alternatively, 3D CNN models were employed in [32], [34].
The depth maps were used to represent the 2D RGB images
into the corresponding 3D volumetric representations. By
comparison, the CT data are naturally in the form of 3D
volumes. However, 3D CNN models suffer from dealing with
high-resolution data due to the computation cost. To alleviate
this issue, 3D graph neural networks were proposed for RGBD
semantic segmentation [35].
Medical image analysis is one of the most active areas of
3D segmentation. U-Net [6] is an effective architecture of
deep neural network model for semantic segmentation. It has
been extended to its 3D variant for a variety of applications
such as pulmonary nodule segmentation [36], [37], skin lesion
segmentation [38], kidney tumor segmentation [39] and infant
brain segmentation [40] in medical images of varying modal-
ities (e.g., Electron Microscopic, CT and MRI). Specifically,
MultiResUNet [38] modifies the original U-Net by employing
Inception-style blocks to capture multi-scale features in the
contraction path (i.e. the encoder). A similar idea of Inception
modules was also employed by [40] for infant brain MRI
segmentation. Residual U-Net introduces residual modules
(i.e. skip connections [41]) to the CNN blocks in the U-Net
architecture and was reported to outperform U-Net by [39]. A
transfer learning framework was proposed in [37] to alleviate
the training data sparsity issues of most medical image analysis
tasks.
Other than the applications in medical image analysis, 3D
semantic segmentation has also been extensively studied in the
domain of point cloud data analysis (e.g., Lidar point cloud)
for a variety of applications including autonomous driving.
PointNet [42] and its variant PointNet++ [7] are two leading
contemporary methods using end-to-end frameworks directly










Fig. 1. The pipeline of our approach to contraband materials detection in baggage CT volumes (two options for semantic segmentation are represented as
two branches, see details in Section III-A and III-B).
ferent down-stream tasks including 3D semantic segmenta-
tion. Due to their generality and effectiveness demonstrated
in the literature, we employ both PointNet and PointNet++
to investigate the possibility of converting 3D CT volumes
to point clouds for efficient semantic segmentation. Other
alternative approaches to point cloud segmentation use the
idea of voxelization to transform the sparse point clouds to
grid representations which can be fed into 3D CNN models
[43]. This is an inverse process of our method and has the
limitation of high computation cost. Since the raw data we
are concerned with is in the form of 3D volumes, the other
alternative to reducing the computation cost is to use sparse
convolutional networks [44] which is also employed by [43].
In our work, we focus mainly on the performance of different
semantic segmentation methods and hence we use a simple
down-sampling strategy to reduce image resolution for more
efficient computation.
III. METHOD
Our work focuses on the detection of contraband materials
with no specific appearances/shapes. Existing prohibited object
detection works focus on the detection of prohibited objects
such as firearms and knives employ traditional object detection
frameworks (i.e. predicting a bounding box for each detected
object) [3]. However, this is not an optimal choice for the
detection of contraband materials which can be of arbitrary
shapes (e.g., curved sheets, liquid in different containers). As
a result, we formulate it as a semantic segmentation problem
and attempt to predict voxel-wise labels for 3D baggage CT
volumes. The segmentation results give potential locations
of contraband items and the classes they belong to. Post-
processing is subsequently employed to refine the segmen-
tation results and generate contraband materials detection
results.
In the following subsections, we first introduce two ap-
proaches to 3D semantic segmentation. As we formulate it as a
semantic segmentation problem, we first extend the prevalent
U-Net architecture [6], [45] for 2D image segmentation to
our 3D CT segmentation scenario. To improve efficiency and
reduce the memory and processing time consumption, we also
explore the possibility of using point cloud processing methods
[7], [42] for CT segmentation. To this end, we convert the
volumetric 3D CT data into sparse point clouds which reserve
only a small fraction of useful voxels in the original volumes
as points. As illustrated in Figure 1, segmentation results
are finally post-processed to generate contraband materials
detection results.
A. 3D CNN Based Method
We follow the work in [45] and extend U-Net architecture to
3D scenarios. As shown in Figure 2, 3D U-Net also consists of
a contraction path and an expanding path. The contraction path
is composed of a sequence of down-sampling modules to cap-
ture context from the input 3D volumes whilst the expanding
path uses a sequence of upsampling modules to expand the
low-resolution feature volumes extracted by the contraction
path to the original resolution. There are L down-sampling
modules in the contraction path and the same number of up-
sampling modules in the expanding path. Skip connections are
used to copy the feature volumes from the contraction path and
concatenate them with the feature volumes of the same level
in the expanding path.
The down-sampling module in 3D U-Net architecture is
composed of two 3D convolution layers, each of which is
followed by ReLU and batch normalisation layers. A pooling
layer is used to down-sampling the spatial resolution of feature
volumes by a factor of 2 in all three dimensions. Specifically,
the number of feature volumes in the l-th level is 2l times
more than that in the 0-th level (denoted as fvols) whilst the
dimension of the feature volumes is 1/2l of that in the original
CT volume. On the other hand, the up-sampling module is
implemented by a non-parametric upsample function in 3D U-
Net followed by two consecutive 3D convolution layers (each
is followed by ReLU and batch normalisation layers) similar to
the counterparts in the contraction path. The details of down-
sampling and up-sampling modules are shown in the dashed
boxes of Figure 2.
Figure 2 also illustrates the details of down-sampling and
up-sampling modules of the residual 3D U-Net architecture
in the dashed boxes. Compared with those in 3D U-Net, the
main difference is three-fold. Firstly, there are three 3D con-
volution layers (as well as the ReLU and batch normalisation
layers) in each module. Secondly, there is a skip connection
between the first and third convolution layers. Finally, a 3D
deconvolution layer is used in residual 3D U-Net as opposed
to the interpolation-based up-sampling layer in the 3D U-Net.
B. Point Cloud Based Methods
In a baggage CT volume, there are usually large regions of
non-threat voxels which can be easily recognized by simple









































































Fig. 2. 3D U-Net architectures for semantic segmentation.
of these benign materials in Hounsfield units. To alleviate the
memory and time-intensive issues of 3D CNN models, we
attempt to investigate the possibility of point cloud processing
algorithms in semantic segmentation for volumetric 3D CT
data.
In the first stage, CT volumetic data is converted into a point
cloud by reserving only the voxel-of-interest. Specifically,
we use prior knowledge to set thresholds and consider only
voxels whose intensity values are within a specified range
where contraband materials fall into. As a result, a point is
represented by a 4-dimensional vector of coordinates x, y, z
and the intensity i.
We use the most popular point cloud processing models
PointNet [42] and its extension PointNet++ [7] for the proof
of concept as they perform the best among a few candidates
in our preliminary experiments. PointNet and PointNet++ take
point clouds as the input and generate segmentation results for
our purpose. We use the default model architecture proposed
in the original paper.
Specifically, PointNet takes n points from a point cloud
(may be a sub-block within a large point cloud) as input which
is represented as a n× 4 matrix. PointNet first transforms the
input by a learnable 3×3 transformation matrix. Subsequently,
all point features are fed into a Multi-Layer Perceptron module
(MLP) and transformed to a n × 64 feature matrix. Similar
processing is repeated and finally a n × 1024 feature matrix
is generated and max-pooled to get a global feature of 1024
dimensions. For semantic segmentation in our case, the global
feature is concatenated with each point feature (i.e. the one of
64 dimensions) to form a n feature matrix which again is fed
into a sequence of MLP until the final output layer generating
the segmentation results.
PointNet++, as an extension of PointNet, takes n points
from a point cloud as input which is represented as a n × 7
matrix where the three more features than those used in
PointNet are normalized point coordinates x′, y′ and z′.
PointNet++ learns hierarchical point set features via the set
abstraction module which is composed of point sampling
and grouping followed by PointNet based feature extraction.
The set abstraction modules are repeated for twice before a
sequence of interpolation and unit PointNet to generate final
segmentation results of the same resolution as the input.
C. Post-processing
The segmentation results of 3D U-Net and PointNet++ are
voxel-wise and point-wise class labelling respectively. We con-
vert these segmentation results to detection results in the post-
processing stage. Specifically, we group the connected voxels
which are labelled as the same class as a detected object. To
these ends, we use morphological operations to correct the
mislabelling information in the segmentation results.
The pipeline of post-processing is shown in Figure 3.
For each foreground class, we apply dilation and erosion
operations sequentially to the binary segmentation map to
correct the missing voxel labels within the detected objects.
Subsequently, the connected component labelling (CCL) al-
gorithm is employed to group the labelled voxels into a set
of potential detected objects. We prune the detection results
by removing the objects whose volumes are smaller than a
pre-defined threshold.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we conduct experiments on a public baggage
CT dataset to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed
approaches to contraband materials detection. We describe
the details of the dataset and evaluation metrics used in our
experiments. Subsequently, we report the quantitative results
of 3D CNN methods and point cloud methods respectively.
Dilation (SE=2)
Segmentation







Fig. 3. The pipeline of post-processing using morphological operations to
convert segmentation results to detection results.
Finally, qualitative evaluation is presented to provide some
intuitive insight into how our approaches perform.
A. Dataset
We follow [5] and use the Northestern University Au-
tomated Threat Recognition (NEU ATR) dataset [8], [46]
collected and annotated by NEU ALERT throughout our
experiments in this study. Baggage CT volumes were collected
by a medical CT scanner (Imatron C-300). The slice size is
512×512 corresponding to the field view of 475 mm×475
mm hence the in-plane pixel size is 0.928 mm. The number
of slices varies in different volumes and the slice spacing is 1.5
mm. Pixel values are represented by the Modified Hounsfield
Unit (MHU) ranging from 0 to 32,767 MHU in which air and
water are 0 and 1024 respectively.
The ATR dataset consists of 188 CT volumes in which
there are 446 object signatures of three target materials (i.e.
saline, rubber and clay) and other non-target materials as
cluttered background of typical packed baggage. The ground
truth voxels are labelled by NEU ALERT for all the objects
of three target materials. We follow [5] to split the whole
dataset into two subsets evenly: odd set and even set containing
94 odd and even indexed volumes respectively (i.e. 50/50,
training/testing data split). In our experiments, we use one
subset for training and the other for testing.
B. Evaluation Metrics
We use three groups of evaluation metrics in our experi-
ments. The first one is the mean Intersection over Union (IoU)
which is a typical evaluation metric for semantic segmentation
as the contraband materials detection has been formulated as
a semantic segmentation problem. IoU is computed for each
class and the mean IoU is the mean of each IoU for all classes.
The mean IoU evaluates the performance of segmentation
but cannot measure the detection performance of individual
objects in a CT volume.
The second group of evaluation metrics are the precision and
recall which can be computed based on the detection results
obtained after post-processing the segmentation results (c.f.
Section III-C).
To make a direct comparison with the traditional method
proposed in [5], we also use a third group of evaluation
metrics in our experiments which have been used in [5].
These evaluation metrics are similar to typical ones for object
detection (i.e. precision and recall in the second group) but
concern the Probability of Detection (PD) and the Probability
of False Alarms (PFA). PD is similar to recall and the main
difference is that PD is computed over all detections regardless
of their classes whilst recall is computed class-wisely. PD
is defined in this way so that the detection model focuses
more on the difference between contraband items and benign
ones rather than the difference between different types of
contraband items.
TABLE I
IOU RESULTS OF MATERIAL SEGMENTATION WITHIN 3D CT VOLUMES ON
NEU ATR DATASET (L – # OF LEVELS IN 3D U-NET; FVOLS – # OF
FEATURE VOLUMES IN 3D U-NET; FAC. – THE DOWNSAMPING FACTOR
USED TO DOWN-SAMPLE THE ORIGINAL CT VOLUMES).
Method L fvols fac. Background Saline Rubber Clay Overall
PointNet - - 2 99.0 15.7 15.5 31.0 40.3
PointNet - - 4 99.1 3.9 5.1 35.5 35.9
PointNet++ - - 2 98.9 39.8 28.2 61.9 57.2
PointNet++ - - 4 99.0 32.6 26.9 50.9 52.3
3D U-Net 4 32 2 99.5 65.3 58.8 74.5 74.5
3D U-Net 4 32 4 99.5 64.2 61.3 66.5 72.9
3D U-Net 4 32 8 99.5 58.7 48.7 60.7 66.9
3D U-Net 4 64 8 99.6 61.8 53.3 64.5 69.8
3D U-Net 6 32 4 99.6 65.5 62.1 69.2 74.1
3D U-Net 6 64 4 99.6 64.9 63.0 72.5 75.0
Resisual 3D U-Net 4 32 2 99.5 56.6 57.7 74.8 72.2
Resisual 3D U-Net 4 32 4 99.6 63.1 60.9 67.0 72.6
Resisual 3D U-Net 6 32 4 99.6 63.5 59.4 73.1 73.9
Resisual 3D U-Net 6 64 4 99.6 67.4 64.6 67.9 74.9
C. Experimental Settings
Extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed methods and to investigate how
different factors affect the performance.
1) Model architecture: We investigate two types of 3D
CNN models (i.e. 3D U-Net and residual 3D U-Net) and one
point cloud model (i.e. PointNet++) in our experiments. For
3D U-Net and residual 3D U-Net architectures, we consider
varying depth and width by setting the number of feature
volumes in the first level (l=0) as fvols ∈ {32, 64} and
the number of down-sampling and up-sampling modules as
L ∈ {4, 6} based on the Pytorch implementation of [45].
As a result, we can have a number of candidate models with
varying combinations of settings. Instead of investigating all
the possible combinations, we select typical ones performing
better as shown in Tables I-III and ignore those providing
less insight. In all experiments, we set the learning rate to
1e−4 and decrease it every 50 epochs by a factor of 0.5. The
training is terminated after 250 epochs. During training, we
randomly crop 3D sub-volumes of size 64×96×96 and apply
data augmentation including normalisation, random flipping
and random rotation (by 90 degrees). Each training batch
constitutes of 16 such sub-volumes from cropped 4 baggage
volumes (4 from each).
For PointNet and PointNet++, we use the default settings
in the PyTorch implementation [47] except the input feature
dimension is adapted since we have only one intensity feature
in our CT data as opposed to three RGB values. The learning
rate is set to 1e − 3 throughout our experiments and decays
by a factor of 0.7 every 50 epochs. The training stops after
250 epochs. In the training, we randomly select 8092 points
TABLE II
PRECISION AND RECALL RESULTS OF MATERIAL SEGMENTATION WITHIN 3D CT VOLUMES ON NEU ATR DATASET (L – # OF LEVELS IN 3D U-NET;
FVOLS – # OF FEATURE VOLUMES IN 3D U-NET; FAC. – THE DOWNSAMPING FACTOR USED TO DOWN-SAMPLE THE ORIGINAL CT VOLUMES).
Model L fvols fac. Saline Rubber Clay OverallP (%) R (%) P (%) R (%) P (%) R (%) P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
PointNet - - 2 35.0 62.8 40.4 56.8 58.2 73.6 44.5 64.4 52.6
PointNet - - 4 31.1 16.2 27.6 13.6 54.5 70.6 37.8 33.5 35.5
PointNet++ - - 2 41.9 84.1 59.7 58.9 60.1 76.9 53.9 73.3 62.1
PointNet++ - - 4 37.8 73.2 56.8 51.3 52.5 79.8 49.0 68.1 57.0
3D U-Net 4 32 2 59.1 94.6 82.6 85.8 76.5 94.2 72.7 91.5 81.0
3D U-Net 4 32 4 77.1 85.2 81.3 90.3 83.7 86.6 80.7 87.3 83.9
3D U-Net 4 32 8 72.4 80.3 82.2 80.6 83.8 80.2 79.5 80.4 79.9
3D U-Net 6 32 4 74.6 90.1 86.2 91.8 86.8 90.5 82.6 90.8 86.5
3D U-Net 6 64 4 71.8 91.0 87.4 92.5 94.6 85.8 84.6 89.8 87.1
3D Residual U-Net 4 32 2 67.2 79.1 82.2 80.6 79.4 92.6 76.3 84.1 80.0
3D Residual U-Net 4 32 4 78.0 82.8 83.8 88.1 93.2 83.0 85.0 84.7 84.8
3D Residual U-Net 6 32 4 79.5 79.3 84.8 89.1 89.2 88.0 84.5 85.5 85.0
3D Residual U-Net 6 64 4 78.4 82.5 87.8 87.3 90.4 91.3 85.5 87.1 86.3
TABLE III
PD AND PFA RESULTS OF MATERIAL SEGMENTATION WITHIN 3D CT
VOLUMES ON NEU ATR DATASET (L – # OF LEVELS IN 3D U-NET; FVOLS
– # OF FEATURE VOLUMES IN 3D U-NET; FAC. – THE DOWNSAMPING
FACTOR USED TO DOWN-SAMPLE THE ORIGINAL CT VOLUMES).
Model L fvols fac. PD (%) PFA (%)Saline Rubber Clay Overall Overall
SVM [5] - - - 87 95 96 92 24
PointNet - - 2 81 84 88 84 29
PointNet - - 4 38 41 80 50 13
PointNet++ - - 2 97 87 94 92 24
PointNet++ - - 4 92 80 86 86 22
3D U-Net 4 32 2 95 94 92 94 11
3D U-Net 4 32 4 86 96 86 90 6
3D U-Net 4 32 8 81 84 81 82 5
3D U-Net 6 32 4 91 96 89 92 5
3D U-Net 6 64 4 91 97 83 91 6
3D Residual U-Net 4 32 2 75 85 86 82 7
3D Residual U-Net 4 32 4 85 94 83 88 5
3D Residual U-Net 6 32 4 80 94 92 89 5
3D Residual U-Net 6 64 4 86 92 92 90 4
from a set of points within a block of size 48 × 48 × 48.
The key to training PointNet and PointNet++ is to balance the
training samples of different classes. Since the background
points are the majority in the training data, we need to give
more weights to points belonging to foreground classes during
selection (i.e. make it more likely to select the block containing
foreground class points). To this end, we tend to select the
blocks containing more than 50% foreground class points as
training samples.
2) Data down-sampling: We also investigate how the
down-sampling factor affects the performance of our methods.
Specifically, we down-sample the CT volumes uniformly by
the factor of 2, 4 and 8 in all three dimensions respectively.
During training, the ground truth labelling volumes are corre-
spondingly down-sampled. In the evaluation, to make different
results comparable, we up-sample the predicted low-resolution
results to the original size and calculate the evaluation metrics.
D. Experimental Results
As the key component of our proposed approach to con-
traband materials detection, different semantic segmentation
models are evaluated by calculating the per-class IoU and
mean IoU. As intermediate results, the performance of seg-
mentation determines the final detection performance to a large
extent. The IoU results of different models are reported in
Table I. The majority of voxels belong to the background
class hence the IoU is close to 100% for all methods. For
three foreground classes, 3D U-Net architectures outperform
point cloud based methods significantly with the best mean
IoU of 75.0%. The use of skip connection in residual 3D U-
Net models does not make a difference from those without
skip connections. Increasing the width and depth of the archi-
tectures of 3D U-Net benefit the performance consistently. For
point cloud based methods, PointNet++ outperforms PointNet
significantly. The best point cloud based method is PointNet++
with the down-sampling factor of 2 and achieves the mean IoU
of 57.2%.
Detection results are evaluated after post-processing by cal-
culating the metrics of precision/recall. The results are shown
in Table II and Table III respectively. Similar conclusions can
be drawn from results in Table II and Table I. The best overall
precision and recall is achieved by 3D U-Net with the depth
of 6 and 64 feature volumes in the first level and the overall
precision and recall are 84.6% and 89.8% respectively.
Following previous works in [5], we report the results of
PD and PFA in Table III. By comparing with the results
of [5], both the point cloud based methods and 3D U-Net
based methods can achieve comparable or better performance.
Although PointNet gives worse results than the traditional
method, its variant PointNet++ can achieve comparable PD
of 92% and PFA of 24%. Consistent with previous results, 3D
U-Net with the depth of 6 and 32 feature volumes in the first
level gives the best performance with the PD of 92% and a
much less PFA of 5%.
E. Qualitative Evaluation
Figure 4 presents five exemplar samples of CT volumes
from the ATR dataset together with their ground truth labelling
and segmentation results generated by the best PointNet++ and
3D U-Net models in our experiments. The first two columns
(from the left side) list the visualisations of CT volumes and
their corresponding ground truth labelling. Three types of
materials saline, rubber and clay are represented by orange,
green and blue colours respectively. The last two columns
list the segmentation results of PointNet++ and 3D U-Net






Fig. 4. Qualitative evaluation of material segmentation and classification using
varying methods for examples A-E.
respectively. It can be seen from example (A) that some
background voxels are mistakenly classified as foreground
classes which will lead to low precision in Table II and high
PFA in Table III. In addition, PointNet++ mistakenly classifies
the material saline as rubber. The examples (B) and (C)
shows that PointNet++ misses a considerable amount of voxels
belonging to a rubber sheet (green) but 3D U-Net gives much
better results. There also exist cases where both PointNet++
and 3D U-Net fail to detect the rubber sheet in example (D)
but mistakenly detect a false alarm saline object.
F. Computational Complexity
Table IV presents the computational complexity of different
models investigated in our work. We consider the number
of parameters and floating point operations (FLOP) given a
typical 3D CT volume with a size of 300 × 512 × 512 in
NEU ATR dataset. From Table IV, we can draw the following
conclusions. Firstly, PointNet++ not only performs better but
also has fewer parameters and computational cost than Point-
Net. Secondly, 3D U-Net is more efficient than 3D residual U-
Net since it has fewer parameters but comparable performance
when the depth and width are the same. Finally, increasing the
depth and width of 3D U-Net is not efficient given the marginal
performance gain and significantly increased computational
cost. All these conclusions provide insightful instructions for
our future work on volumetric 3D CT segmentation.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated two deep learning meth-
ods for contraband materials detection in volumetric 3D CT
imagery. It is demonstrated that both 3D CNN and point cloud
based methods can give reasonably good results for this task
and 3D U-Net outperforms PointNet++ in terms of varying
TABLE IV
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF DIFFERENT MODELS.
Model L fvols fac. # Parameters (M) FLOP (G)
PointNet - - 2 3.53 3440
PointNet - - 4 3.53 430
PointNet++ - - 2 0.97 460
PointNet++ - - 4 0.97 57
3D U-Net 4 32 2 4.08 2250
3D U-Net 4 32 4 4.08 280
3D U-Net 4 32 8 4.08 35
3D U-Net 6 32 4 51.86 305
3D U-Net 6 64 4 207.43 1220
3D Residual U-Net 4 32 2 8.77 3520
3D Residual U-Net 4 32 4 8.77 440
3D Residual U-Net 6 32 4 84.87 470
3D Residual U-Net 6 64 4 339.44 1880
evaluation metrics. However, the point cloud based methods
provide an alternative solution to the efficient processing of
large 3D CT volumes and are worthy of further investigations.
In the future, we would like to expand the evaluation
dataset and consider more types of contraband materials in
aviation security screening. Besides, the detection performance
can be enhanced by employing more advanced architectures
[48] based on either 3D U-Net or point cloud processing
algorithms. Finally, it will be of great value to integrate the
detection of the prohibited object based on appearances [3] and
contraband items based on materials in a unified framework
for plausible real-world applications.
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